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Summary
Zimbabwe endows significant amounts of natural resources but it remains one
of the poorest countries in the world. In 2006, the country discovered major
diamond fields in a remote village called Marange located in the eastern part of
the country. The discovery of such a valuable resource, with potential to generate
great revenues for the state, was seen as an opportunity to re-build the crippled
economy. Surprisingly enough, the discovery of diamonds worsened the economic
and political crisis in Zimbabwe. The diamond fields became a battleground of
the political elites, business elites and artisanal miners competing for diamond
rents. The government’s intervention in the diamond fields was haphazard and
chaotic.
The study aims to establish factors why the supply of such a valuable resource
failed to generate positive results in Zimbabwe yet other countries such as neigh-
bouring Botswana succeeded. I argue that poor quality of institutions is the main
factor explaining the country’s long run poor economic performance. The discov-
ery of diamonds in Marange provides evidence of waste and corruption of mineral
wealth by political elites. I focus on the central role played by political elites in
the domestic political economy in rent seeking activities. I argue that bad insti-
tutions in Zimbabwe encourage political elites to engage in rapacious rent seeking
activities. Extraction of diamonds generates excess resource rents creating an at-
mosphere of extreme abundance that encourages political elites to engage in rent
seeking (Herb, 2005). Such activities are harmful for economic growth due to a
number of reasons. Rent seeking activities involve misuse of public funds from
diamonds, reduction of output in the economy and stifles innovation.
I discuss the events in Zimbabwe through a rent seeking model by Mehlum et
al. (2006). The model looks at how the quality of institutions in countries that
have just discovered precious minerals affects the incentives of entrepreneurs that
specialize in rent seeking and production activities. In their model, entrepreneurs
freely allocate themselves between rent seeking and productive activities as deter-
mined by the relative payoffs. The gains from each activity are determined by the
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quality of institutions as measured by rule of law, bureaucratic quality and corrup-
tion in government. When institutional quality is high, majority of entrepreneurs
engage in productive activities. In this case, more natural resources result in higher
total income. Poor institutions open opportunity for entrepreneurs into grabbing
and due to negative externalities in rent seeking; more natural resources lower the
aggregate income. Their model predicts that low institutional quality in resource
abundant countries results in a resource curse, whereas good institutions lead to
a blessing.
I build on the model by Mehlum et al. (2006) by introducing an additional as-
sumption to capture the events in my context. In their model, they assume that
entrepreneurs can freely move from production to grabbing and vice versa through-
out the whole period depending on which activity is more profitable as given by the
relative payoffs. In Zimbabwe, this assumption only applies to the initial stages
in the discovery of diamonds as evidenced by the state allowing open access to
any person wishing to dig diamonds. Later, the state decided to restore control of
the diamond fields by evicting all players who were involved in the extraction of
diamonds and restricting entry of any other interested groups. This left political
actors dominating the space and setting the mining terms of interested mining
companies. To capture this in my model, I impose the assumption that producers
cannot freely switch from production to grabbing as the payoffs to grabbing in-
crease. However grabbers are free to move from grabbing into production as the
profits to production exceed profits from grabbing. Grabbers are political elites
who use their political power to acquire control over diamonds. This applies to
Zimbabwean politicians who restricted the entry of other players to reduce com-
petition for diamond rents.
The model predicts that free movement of entrepreneurs has negative consequences
for economic growth in countries with bad institutions. In this case, countries with
poor institutions are better off without natural resources because the discovery of
minerals pulls entrepreneurs from running productive firms into counterproduc-
tive rent seeking activities. The model predicts that restricted movement of en-
trepreneurs into grabbing has positive effects in countries with natural resources.
The discovery of a resource in states with bad institutions that restrict entry of
producers into rent seeking activities does not distort the existing state of affairs
in the economy. The economy continues to run as if nothing occurred. The net
result is that there is no change in total income following the discovery of the
natural resource. In terms of growth, the country converges to the same income
level as it had prior the discovery of the resource. Hence, the discovery of minerals
has no negative effect on the economy of countries with poor institutions as long
as producers do not abandon running productive firms in favour of rent seeking
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activities.
Lack of reliable, logical, consistent and complete data on the size of diamond
deposits and production output in Marange, motivated the use of satellite light
density data as a proxy to the level of economic activity. Several scholars have used
this method to overcome the problems posed by lack of access to data on income
growth in many different parts of the world. Satellite light density at night is the
amount of human generated light observed from outer space which shows the size
of human settlements and industrial activity. Night time light data is provided
by the National Geophysical Data Center of the United States National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) website. The advantage of night light
data is that it covers the whole world which makes comparisons between different
regions possible.
To explore the effects of the discovery of diamonds in the country, I use changes in
light intensity from the time of discovery in 2006 up to 2010, focusing on the region
where diamonds were discovered, Marange and the nearby provincial capital city
of Mutare. The night light images show sudden growth in economic activity in
Marange beginning 2010. Growth in economic activity in Marange and Mutare
proves that institutions in Zimbabwe are still functioning shown by the govern-
ment’s efforts to foster growth. There is evidence to support the idea that the
country’s institutions are not completely dismantled.
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1 Introduction
Zimbabwe, among other African countries endows significant amounts of natural
resources and is a key natural resource exporter. In 2006, amid the free fall of
the Zimbabwean economy due to government faulted land reform program and
subsequent political violence, the nation discovered that it is home to significant
deposits of diamonds which prompts investigation into why such vast minerals
at the disposal of the nation cannot translate into economic development and
wellbeing (Saunders et al. 2008 p.1). The aim of this paper is to establish why the
supply of such a valuable resource failed to generate positive results in Zimbabwe
yet other countries have succeeded.
In many cases, supply of natural resources comes with undesirable economic and
political consequences. According to Hawkins (2009), it has always remained a
puzzle how an export-driven natural resource sector that creates huge sources of
income for the government and international corporations fails to foster or render
economic development for the good of all sectors of the population particularly
the poor. To this, economists have noted a trend that resource rich countries are
associated with undesirable economic, political and social outcomes coupled with
retarding economic growth, tendencies towards autocracy and civil war (Roser,
2006). Surprisingly enough, a majority of African resource-rich countries have
lived up to that expectation because they top the world’s poorest countries with
political disorder a characteristic they all share.
According to international standards, Zimbabwe is not a resource abundant na-
tion; however, it possesses a vast range of natural resources. The country has
deposits of platinum, gold, nickel and the recently discovered new deposits of di-
amonds. (Hawkins, 2009 p.1). The main argument of this thesis focuses on the
undesirable political, social and economic outcomes that come with the supply
of valuable natural resources irrespective of whether a country is rich in natural
resources.
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1.1 Literature Review
The relationship between natural resources and development is not a new subject in
the field of economics. Vast literature has shown empirical evidence of the existence
of a negative relationship between resource rich countries and development (Gelb,
1988; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Gylfason et al., 1999). This phenomenon is known
as the natural resource curse or paradox of plenty (Sachs and Warner, 2001 p.837).
Resource curse refers to the self-contradictory assertion verified by observation and
experience that resource abundant countries tend to grow less in the long run than
resource poor countries (Andersen and Aslaksen, 2008 p.228). The main question
that every research must answer is: What lies behind the natural resource curse
as posed by Sachs and Warner (2001 p.833). Different scholars propose various
explanations concerning complexity of the natural resource curse.
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999, and 2001) and Van Wijnbergen (1984) made the
early contributions in the literature explaining causes of the natural resource curse.
Their explanation of the natural resource curse focused on the “Dutch disease”.
The Dutch Disease model involves an economy with three sectors namely natural
resource sector, manufacturing sector and non-traded sector. Discovery of new
resources creates a huge demand for non-traded goods such as input costs and
wages. An increase in supply of natural resources concentrates production in
natural resources at the expense of the manufacturing sector. This causes a shift
of capital and labour from the manufacturing sector to the natural resource sector.
With economic growth driven by traded-manufacturing activities, a decline in
manufacturing slows growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995 p.6).
Recently, this pure economic explanation of the natural resource curse is becom-
ing unpopular with recent studies that focus on political institutions of a country
(Robinson et al, 2006 pp. 450-451). The major setback of Dutch disease models
is its failure to explain why particular countries do not experience the resource
curse whilst other countries get trapped in the resource curse. The different expe-
riences across many natural resource abundant countries have led to the growth of
other explanations that concentrate more on the political institutions of a country
(Mehlum et al. 2006; Robinson et al. 2006; Auty and Gelb 2001).
A wide range of literature exists on political economy models that look at the
relationship between quality of institutions and natural resource abundance. The
most relevant and recent work in this area includes Lane and Tornell (1999), Auty
and Gelb (2001), Isham et al. (2002), Torvik (2002), Sala-i-Martin and Subra-
manian (2003), Herb (2005), Robinson et al. (2006) and Mehlum et al. (2006).
The main idea common to all the above models is that quality of institutions is
central to achieving substantial growth in natural resource abundant countries.
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Models such as those by Robinson et al. (2006), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian
(2003) and Isham et al.(2002) focus on how natural resources create adverse incen-
tives for political governments holding power. While models by Tornell and Lane
(1999), Herb (2005), Mehlum et al (2006) focus on how the prevailing quality of
institutions affects the decision of entrepreneurs that specialize in rent seeking and
production. Discussing all of the above models is not the main goal in this thesis
but I will briefly discuss two models that are popular and complementary to my
approach.
Robinson et al. (2006) model refers to a politician holding office in the first period
with the desire to be re-elected in the second period elections. Natural resources
are a huge source of income that accumulates into the hands of government and
the ultimate decision lies with the politician in office regarding quantity of the
resource to extract and to leave for the future. The politician can either spend the
resource rents or use the rents to influence election results. Weingrod (1968 p.379)
refers to the “the ways in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special
favours in exchange for electoral support,” as patronage.
Robinson et al argue that the discovery of natural resources is not beneficial to
the economy if it is coupled with inefficient redistribution. Their model predicts
that institutions play a central role in determining whether resource booms end
up as resource curse or not. This is because natural resources increase the gains of
staying in power by providing politicians with vast resources which they can use
to influence the outcome of elections thus increasing resource mis-allocation in the
rest of the economy. Countries that benefit from supply of natural resources are
characterised by institutions that accept responsibility for their activities and have
the ability to carry out their duties successfully. The resource curse is inevitable
in countries that do not resemble such institutions.
1.1.1 Theoretical Perspectives
I base my study on views from Mehlum et al. (2006). The rent seeking model by
Mehlum et al. (2006) looks at how the quality of institutions in countries that have
just discovered valuable minerals influences the incentives of entrepreneurs that
specialise in rent seeking and production activities. In the model, entrepreneurs
allocate themselves between rent seeking and productive activities as determined
by the relative payoffs. The gains from each activity are determined by the quality
of institutions as measured by rule of law, bureaucratic quality and corruption in
government. When institutional quality is high, then majority of entrepreneurs
engage into the more profitable productive activities. In this case, more natu-
ral resources result in higher total income. Weak institutions make it possible
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for entrepreneurs to grab and due to negative externalities in rent seeking, more
natural resources lower the aggregate income. Their model predicts that low in-
stitutional quality in resource abundant countries results in a resource curse and
good institutions lead to a blessing.
Herb (2005) argues that the main problem with owning mineral wealth is that it
generates resource rents, surplus earnings over and above all costs and normal prof-
its. This is characteristic of alluvial diamond deposits, which go into production
faster generating quick cash flow. Alluvial diamonds are highly attractive for their
significantly low operating and capital costs. The supply of surface diamonds that
can be exploited without much difficulty by means of simple mining techniques
involving hand-digging and panning offers possibilities to invest in mining at low
cost. This leads to extreme competition and conflict for resources among inter-
ested actors such as illegal miners, business elites and political elites (Saunders,
2009). The availability of such resource rents is associated with stunted growth
because it creates an environment of extreme abundance that encourages politi-
cal elites to maximize personal short-term gains trading future development goals.
Powerful interested actors such as political agents engage in rapacious rent seeking
behaviour causing deterioration in the quality and ability of the state to control
and monitor the economy thus creating room to activities that do not promote
growth (Herb, 2005).
Auty and Gelb (2001) concur that the characteristics of political institutions are
central to determining the interaction between natural resource endowment and
economic outcome. Resource abundant countries tend to be marked by political
competition for resource rents leading to nations infested by conflict and exploita-
tive behaviour that causes inefficient distribution of rents and dysfunctional econ-
omy. Point source resources such as diamonds have the effect of channelling all
rents to the government causing a gradual crumbling down of the political econ-
omy. Point resources easily distort the economy unlike diffuse resources such as
land (Auty, 2004).
Auty and Gelb (2001) also argue that resource abundant countries prefer the use
of indirect redistribution mechanisms to allocate natural resource rents. The use of
transparent mechanisms involving direct distribution is viewed as politically incon-
venient and impractical because it allows the public to air out their opinions on the
most suitable ways to distribute income, a process politicians are not prepared to
undertake. The use of direct and transparent mechanisms in distributing rents im-
plies that political regimes in resource abundant countries waive the use of wealth
from natural resources as a tool that aids in affirming their political dominance
and practice consistent economic policies aimed at fostering growth.
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Citing Nigeria as an example, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) illustrated
how distinct resources such as oil and minerals have a negative influence on growth
through their detrimental effect on institutional quality. They agree that poor in-
stitutional development characterised by corruption, weak governance, rent seeking
and plunder, will remain a thorn in the side of fragile economies that own natu-
ral resources. In their paper, they claim that the main reasons behind Nigeria’s
long-run sub-standard levels of economic growth are waste and corruption. Their
paper echoes the same sentiments as Herb (2005) that in order to address the re-
source curse, institutions should adopt direct distribution mechanisms of mineral
rents to the public. However, this calls for a stark improvement in the quality of
institutions.
The discovery of alluvial diamonds in June 2006 has stood as a major test in the
quality of institutions characterising Zimbabwe. This is supported by Mehlum
et al. (2006) who state that natural resources put institutions to a test such
that countries with poor institutions experience negative growth while countries
with good institutions associate natural resources with a stepping-stone towards
development. The discovery of diamonds in Marange showed to great lengths
the extractive nature of the political and economic institutions rooted in Zim-
babwe.
According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012 p.81), “Extractive political institu-
tions concentrate power in the hands of a narrow elite and place few constraints
on the exercise of this power.” This means that power is not widely and openly
distributed as much as is needed in society to ensure political institutions that
exist solely to serve the people. Authority lies with a few individuals who are
not prepared to put in place policies that restrict the manner in which they can
use their power. “Extractive economic institutions are characterised by insecure
private property rights, a biased system of law, lack of provision of public services
resulting in a non-level playing field in which people cannot exchange and contract,
significant barriers to entry of new businesses and lack of freedom by the people
to choose desired careers” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, pp. 74-75). Powerful
politicians can influence the type of economic institutions that prevail in a country
in such a way as to enable them to draw as many resources as possible from the
entire society.
The characteristics of economic and political institutions are vital in any society
because they influence the incentives of businesses, individuals and politicians that
all determine the success or failure of a nation. All societies are guided by specific
economic and political rules that they have personally put in place. The state,
in partnership with the citizens, ensures compliance to the set rules. Economic
institutions are responsible for shaping economic incentives. This involves the
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motivation to invest in education, to save, set up new businesses, and introduce
new ideas and technologies. Political institutions decide on the type of economic
institutions that prevail, set up policies that enable citizens to have an effect on
their behaviour and give the citizens the power to hold politicians accountable
for their actions. There exists a strong relationship between a nation’s political
institutions and economic institutions. Economic institutions are endogenous to
the type of political institutions because the existence, survival, and persistence of
particular economic institutions depend on political institutions. Hence economic
institutions are a resemblance of the political institutions that exist in a country
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).
Inclusive economic institutions value individual talents of its people and they set
up the necessary institutions such as schools to help build and nurture their tal-
ents. In addition, they provide necessities such as good infrastructure, health
care, electricity, and clean water. Good economic institutions create a conducive
environment for investment ventures, free of barriers to new investors and make
available means of funding. Secure private property rights give investors the con-
fidence to build big projects and achieve great things without any fear of losing
their hard worked wealth through unlawful means. The role of political institu-
tions is to ensure consistency, reliability, and dependability of prevailing economic
institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).
1.1.2 Diamonds in Zimbabwe: An Institutional Theory Approach
Various factors contribute to the failure of natural resource led growth in Zim-
babwe. According to Roser (2006), social forces and external political and eco-
nomic environments play a role in contributing to poor growth levels in resource
rich nations. Zimbabwe’s negative economic consequences of increasingly depend-
ing on natural resources are due to a number of mechanisms. Such mechanisms
include long term declines in terms of trade of countries that export minerals, high
volatility in export earnings due to large short and medium swings in the world
market prices for minerals, and the Dutch Disease effects causing considerable real
appreciation in the value of the currency. The latter has adverse effects on the
other sectors of the economy like agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism which
experience negative terms of trade weakening the incentives to create a diversified
economy and the need to expand exports. In addition the country has experienced
macroeconomic instability marked by hyperinflation rendering the local currency
valueless and migration of skills and investors. Over the past years we have wit-
nessed a huge out-flux of investors to neighbouring countries such as South Africa,
Zambia and Malawi. Entrepreneurs especially in the mining industry are not
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willing to invest in the country because it lacks consistent binding policies that
guarantee secure property rights owing to the low levels of investment and less
than average output levels (Hawkins, 2009; Frankel, 2010).
I argue that Zimbabwe’s disappointing growth levels are mainly due to poor quality
of political institutions. The government adopts economically unsound policies
causing increased spending by the state. Increased availability of funds has also
lured politicians into rent-seeking activities to finance patronage and fractional
politics as evidenced by Zimbabwe’s political system (Hawkins, 2009). Given my
context, I choose to focus on the internal political consequences of natural resources
as the main factor owing to poor economic performance in Zimbabwe. Such factors
include the characteristics of the political government as evidenced by widespread
corruption, low levels of democracy and lack of accountability (Herb 2005). Taking
economic factors as given affecting almost any country, this allows me to focus on
the internal factors which are a choice made by government.
In this paper, I take a complimentary perspective to the above scholars that focuses
on institutional theory to explain the events in Zimbabwe. I share the same opinion
with Mehlum et al. (2006) that the main pathway to success in resource abundant
countries lies in the quality of institutions. With specific reference to Marange
diamonds, the aim of this paper is to show how the quality of institutions in Zim-
babwe has largely affected the extraction of the diamond resource, distribution of
the resource rents, low levels of investment and the dwindling economic perfor-
mance confirming the long-lived and familiar cycle of poverty. The study looks at
how the country’s political institutions have influenced the manner in which the
economy has responded to the discovery of diamonds in Zimbabwe.
This thesis argues that Marange diamonds have been marked by inconsistent and
unsound government intervention. Following a crumbling down of the government-
mining sector, the state has been involved in corruption, chaotic mining operations,
violence and illegal diamond trade. The government’s haphazard approach to the
mining of diamonds caused not only economic losses but land degradation, silta-
tion of rivers and de-forestry (Sachikonye 2007; Saunders et al. 2008). I have a
distinctive interest in Marange diamonds because they were discovered at a time
when the Zimbabwean economy had collapsed as evidenced by sky rocketing in-
flation, high unemployment, poor delivery of public goods and services and fast
shrinking Gross Domestic Product (GDP) just to mention a few. Marange di-
amonds posed a golden opportunity to re-build the country’s economy within a
short space of time given the large volumes of revenue generated from 2006 to the
present date. Instead the event deepened the economic and political crisis which
raises more questions than answers. Marange fields became a battleground of the
poverty-stricken artisanal miners, greedy politicians and business elites competing
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for possession of the precious stone (Sachikonye 2007).
The first sign of failure in public institutions is the emergency of rent seeking.
Rent refers to an excess return that is higher than what a person would gain given
a competitive market. The term rent-seeking can be defined as an expenditure of
resources in order to gain by expanding one’s share of existing wealth without the
creation of new wealth or alternatively it is defined as activities that are aimed at
creating, maintaining or changing rights and institutions which are responsible for
the existence of a specific type of rent (Khan et al. 2000).
Mehlum et al. (2006) model helps to illustrate rent seeking behaviour in Zimbabwe.
Not all scholars share the same opinion regarding the effects of rent seeking ac-
tivities on the economy owing to the different definitions given to the term rent
seeking. Some scholars such as Khan et al. (2000) claim that rent seeking activ-
ities play a big role in issues of development while some scholars such as Murphy
et al. (1993) argue that rent seeking activities are bad for economic growth. How-
ever, most scholars do agree that certain rent seeking activities are harmful for
economic growth. Rent seeking is not a problem exclusive to developing countries
alone but is also existent in developed countries. The only difference is that rent
seeking activities in developing countries have far-reaching negative consequences
that usually take the form of illegal activities rendering them harmful for economic
growth (Khan et al. 2000).
Some forms of rent seeking are used to enhance value for society whereas some
forms of rent seeking reduce value for society. Destructive forms of rent seeking
include bribing. Political activities of lobbying and advertising are termed legal
forms of rent seeking (Khan et al. 2000). According to Murphy et al (1993)
there is private and public rent seeking which are both bad for growth. Private
rent seeking mainly takes the form of theft of existing stocks of wealth such as
land, output and capital whereas public rent seeking mainly involves government
officials with power to influence the success of the private sector, sucking wealth
from the private sector through corruption and lobbying. Private rent seeking has
the effect of reducing output in the economy following a shift of entrepreneurs
from productive activities that are subject to rent seeking into more profitable
rent seeking activities. Public rent seeking has the effect of stifling innovation in
the economy which is central to economic growth. Entrepreneurs starting up their
own firms need publicly provided goods and services such as permits, licenses,
import quotas and state infrastructure. Government officials enact barriers such
that innovators cannot easily get access to the necessary goods and services to
start up their own firms and thus enhances chances of corruption and payoffs from
corruption.
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Rent seeking refers to a wide range of activities. To clearly capture the context
in which I discuss this phenomenon, I tailor down my definition of rent seeking
to focus on a very specific type of rent. I highlight the necessary political and
institutional conditions that are conducive for such forms of rent seeking. My
interest lies in natural resource rents. To explain the events in Zimbabwe I focus
on the ‘rentier state’ approach. According to Matti (2010) the ‘rentier state’
approach explores the interaction between resources and political institutions. In
this context, “rent seeking is the use of government revenue without benefiting
society” (Matti, 2010 pp. 3-4). Extraction of resources generates billions of dollars
which accrue directly to the government enhancing the chances of funds misuse.
Misuse of funds is practiced in an environment of extractive institutions where
citizens do not have the power to hold politicians accountable for their actions. “A
rentier state is a state in which rent seeking is the core function of the government”
(Matti, 2010 pp. 3-4). This means that the state solely exists to make personal
gains through unlawful ways.
I have a particular interest in resource rents which due to their external nature do
not need stringent levels of public accountability and transparency. Such type of
rents that are easy to grab quickly determine the type of institutions that exist in
a country whereby strong institutions are able to withstand the temptation of easy
money whereas weak institutions will fall into the trap and succumb to pressures
of looting. Resource extraction creates huge sources of income which desperately
need grounded institutions to keep a clear record of the revenues. ‘Rentier states’
lack the political will to fight corruption. Instead political elites are in favour of
deteriorating institutional quality and they further work to dismantle institutions
so as to carry out their rent seeking activities without any hindrances. The idea
that rents refer to incomes that are usually higher than what a person would gain
in a competitive market has the effect of further motivating agents to find ways of
creating such rents and maintaining the rents (Khan et al. 2000).
Building on the rent seeking model by Mehlum et al (2006), I aim to show the
active role played by powerful agents in the domestic political economy in rent-
seeking activities. Political agents do not play a passive role in cases where there is
a lot to gain, instead they dominate the space. I include an additional assumption
to the model to capture the ideas in my context. In their model they assume
that entrepreneurs can freely move from production to grabbing and vice versa
throughout the whole period depending on which activity is more profitable as
given by the relative payoffs. In Zimbabwe, this assumption only applies to the
initial stages in the discovery of diamonds as evidenced by the government allowing
open access to anyone wishing to dig diamonds. Following that the state decided to
restore control of the diamond fields by evicting all players who were involved in the
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extraction of diamonds and restricting entry of any other interested groups. This
left political elites dominating the space and setting the mining terms of interested
mining companies. To capture this in my model, I impose the assumption that
producers cannot freely switch from production to grabbing as the returns to
grabbing exceed profits from production. However grabbers are free to move from
grabbing into production as the profits to production exceed profits from grabbing.
Grabbers are political elites who use their power to gain control over diamonds.
This applies to Zimbabwean politicians who restricted the entry of other actors to
reduce competition for diamond rents.
In the model, I look at the economy of Zimbabwe as a whole. The economy com-
prises of entrepreneurs who emerge from the same pool who are distinguished by
their activities. A proportion of entrepreneurs is made up of producers who engage
in the production of goods and services in different sectors of the economy. Prof-
its from production are not subject to rent seeking. This means that wealth and
property from production cannot be stolen or unlawfully seized from the rightful
owner. The sudden discovery of diamonds increases the level of income in the
economy producing large volumes of revenue. Diamond rents create opportunities
for rent seeking. This encourages the other proportion of entrepreneurs to engage
in rent seeking activities. Rent seekers comprise of all persons that are interested
in diamonds such as artisanal miners, unauthorized traders, business elites and
political elites. This creates tension among the interested players who are com-
peting for the same limited resource rents. Competition for diamond rents evokes
insider and outsider identities as a way of claiming access to diamond rents and
restricting access of the other.
Insiders are politicians who manage to secure their place as grabbers by use of their
political power which they can also use to tilt institutions to enhance profitability
of their activities. Outsiders are producers who want to shift from productive
activities into more profitable rent seeking activities. Insiders use different methods
to ensure that outsiders do not get access to diamond rents. With restricted entry
into grabbing, producers continue to produce output in different sectors of the
economy or migrate to other countries.
I discuss the implications of free entry and restricted entry into grabbing and show
how the two assumptions are related to the allocation of entrepreneurs and payoffs
to grabbing and production. I look at the effects of the discovery of diamonds on
the economy under the set of assumptions and different types of institutions and
show how the overall outcome of events depends on the quality of institutions.
With the aid of satellite light density data, I measure the growth in economic
activity in Marange and the nearby city of Mutare and also use the data to as-
sess the quality of institutions in Zimbabwe. Lastly, I use the model as a lens
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through which to examine the causes and key factors owing to the poor economic
performance in Zimbabwe.
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter two gives a brief economic history
of Zimbabwe and the important sectors of the economy. Chapter three gives a
background of Marange diamonds followed by a section on the characteristics of
diamonds. This chapter also includes a section on satellite light density data
which is used as a proxy to the level of economic activity in Marange diamond
fields and the nearby city of Mutare. Chapter four introduces the model. Chapter
five contains implications of the model and its relevance to Zimbabwe’s economic
history.
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2 Economic History of
Zimbabwe
To enhance understanding of the following sections, I give a brief background into
the major economic events shaping Zimbabwe from the time the country attained
its independence to the present. The main idea is to show how the economy has
progressed over the years and highlight factors that have influenced the present
economic and political outcomes.
Though Zimbabwe attained independence from Britain in 1980, the country did not
inherit purely extractive institutions which were established by colonizers for the
purposes of simply extracting resources. She became a settler colony with inclusive
institutions. The colonial settlers developed infrastructure, set up industries and
capitalist firms, and the country enjoyed good state services, a strong working class
and high incomes. The new government under the leadership of Robert Mugabe
“inherited one of the most structurally developed economies and effective state
systems in Africa, and decisions were more strongly influenced by policy theory
rather than pure clientelism” (Brett, 2005 p.92).
Between the years 1980 and 1990, the new regime adopted a corporatist system
with the state controlling most of the economic activities. Corporatism involves
the organization of society into corporations that are controlled by the government.
The state forms different industrial and professional corporations led by workers
and employers acting as organs of political representation and controlling activities
of the persons within their jurisdiction. After independence the new government
carried over with colonial policies and worked to address the racial imbalances of
the colonial period. Prices, allocation of resources and investment were controlled
by the government. Protectionism was used to safeguard local infant industries.
Davies and Rattsø (2000) define protectionism “as a tariff equivalent of a quota
raising the price of importables above the world market level”. The new regime
established a minimum wage and stripped off the employers’ ability to dismiss
employees. Health and education were freely accessible to all. Subsidies on all
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basic consumer goods were introduced. Government spending and tax revenue
increased. The government retained sole ownership of public utilities such as
electricity, water and public transport, and agricultural marketing agencies (Brett,
2005).
The corporatist policies resulted in significant gains which included a decline in
economic inequality, widespread access to education and health care, reduced food
prices in the cities, GDP growth, protection of local industries from external com-
petition, low interest rates due to financial regulations, rising wages and low infla-
tion (Brett, 2005).
However, the corporatist policies also posed challenges to the economy. In the
late 1980s tension started to grow between the regime’s socialist ideology and
capitalists. New investors wasted a lot of time and incurred transaction costs in
the process of obtaining licenses to set up businesses and be able to dismiss in-
dividual workers. The government’s management of the interest rate artificially
kept interest rates down which suppressed savings. The state developed a natu-
ral tendency to borrow which reduced supply of capital to a limited number of
borrowers. Protection of domestic high cost companies raised input costs to ex-
porters leading to shrinking exports. Severe shortages of foreign currency made it
impossible to purchase foreign technology. Political elites did not encourage the
growth of strong African investors in fear of losing their grip on power. Coun-
trywide provision of public services increased government spending which led to
persistent budget deficit, high taxes and high public debt. Lack of credit following
fiscal deficit, high taxes, poor allocation of resources by the state and shortages of
foreign currency stifled private investment. Controls over wages and employment
deterred companies from hiring new workers which increased unemployment. All
these problems posed threats to the legitimacy of the new regime especially from
the eyes of the urban working people who were affected by rising unemployment
and falling wages. A series of economic challenges called for the need to set up new
economic reforms which was first raised by the business elite (Brett, 2005).
By the late 1980s, the government decided to implement new economic policies
to address the country’s economic crisis. It was in 1991 that the government
yielded to pressure from the international community and business elite to adopt
a five year Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). The main goal of
ESAP was to create jobs through the “removal of price controls, removal of wage
controls, reduction of government expenditure, a 40 percent devaluation of the
Zimbabwean dollar, removal of subsidies on basic consumer goods, liberalization
in the foreign currency allocation system, removal of protection of non-productive
import substituting industries and increased profit remittance abroad, and a radi-
cal restructuring of the various parastatals and other public enterprises” (Sichone,
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2002; Brett, 2005).
The rapid changes to various structures that came along with ESAP involved costs
and benefits. The benefits of ESAP entailed significant economic growth, that
includes increased foreign exchange reserves and growing employment. According
to Mumbengegwi (2002, p.201) ESAP increased capital formation, share of exports
in GDP and reduced rural-urban inequality.
However ESAP just like any policy, imposed costs on the economy and it did not
take time to notice the downfalls of ESAP. In late 1997 the country started expe-
riencing a series of macro-economic problems. These included a drop in growth,
employment, wages and social service spending. The budget deficit and inflation
remained high. Stiff external competition and high real interest rates forced many
industrial firms specializing in footwear and textiles to shut down. Scholars claim
that apart from the costs emanating from ESAP as a policy, negative externalities
and internal political factors increased the incidence of a failed program (Brett,
2005).
During the time ESAP was implemented, the country experienced severe droughts
in 1992, 1993 and 1995 which greatly compromised the success of ESAP. Drought
reduced agricultural output, exports and state revenue. It also affected the manu-
facturing industry which depended on the agricultural sector for inputs. The state
increased spending in form of drought relief programmes. The withdrawal of the
much needed financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in
1994 undermined the effectiveness of ESAP (Brett, 2005).
In 1998 in the midst of ongoing economic problems, counterproductive political
decisions were taken by the government. The government sent the Zimbabwean
army to intervene in a civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
which heightened the economic problems in the country. This was costly for the
government not only in terms of the millions of dollars spent in the war but also
forfeited the opportunity to receive aid from the international economic aid (Brett,
2005).
In 2000, unexpected social problems in the form of disgruntled war veterans who
claimed compensation for their involvement in the liberation war forced the gov-
ernment to overlook its fiscal constraints and pay out large sums of money to every
person who claimed to be a war veteran. This had the effect of increasing inflation
(Brett, 2005).
In the same year there was growing dissatisfaction among many Zimbabweans and
war veterans who claimed an equal share of the economic pie especially land. This
forced the government to further take drastic and radical measures which had far
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reaching consequences on the economy. In 2000 the government embarked on a
land reform program aimed at ensuring equitable distribution of land among the
landless majority. The acquisition of land involved the violent eviction of many
white farmers from the productive farms mainly by war veterans. This adversely
affected the commercial agricultural sector which was mainly controlled by white
farmers (Brett, 2005).
The following years 2002-2004 were marked by severe food shortages. This was
worsened by dry weather conditions in 2002 coupled with deteriorating irrigation
system. The rural sector was mainly affected during this period as the eviction of
white farmers led to the loss of service sector support and access to cheaper agricul-
tural products from the farms. In the cities people travelled to neighbouring coun-
tries such as South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique to buy all sorts of groceries
ranging from bread to cooking oil. The price of food commodities sky rocketed
beyond the means of the majority (Coomer and Gstraunthaler, 2011).
Severe economic problems forced the government to abandon its initial policies
on taxation and prices. For example shortages of food and basic commodities
encouraged some businessman to exploit customers by overcharging commodities.
Late 2002, the government re-imposed price controls on all basic goods. Control of
prices forced many firms to shut down since the set prices were below production
costs and reduced investment incentives. The state resumed management of the
exchange rate by closing all foreign exchange bureaus and authorizing only banks
to take part in foreign exchange deals (Brett, 2005; Coomer and Gstraunthaler,
2011).
During the same period, supply of electricity, water, transport and health services
was erratic. The country experienced chronic power cuts due to worn out infras-
tructure and lack of equipment. Many homes had no access to clean running tap
water in their homes and they resorted to fetching water in buckets. Every sector
of the economy technically seized to function (Doran, 2009).
Every preceding event seemed to pave way for more serious economic problems. In
2004-2009 the economy was gripped by hyperinflation rendering the local currency
valueless. The Zimbabwean dollar was officially phased out in 2009 paving way
for dollarization. The country adopted the US dollar and South African Rand for
all its transactions (Kairiza, 2009). Dollarization stabilized prices, imposed fiscal
discipline and improved revenue performance. However dollarization imposed chal-
lenges on the economy such as shortage of credit and coins for daily transactions
(Coomer and Gstraunthaler, 2011).
At the peak of unresolved economic problems political instability took its toll in
2008. The emergence of opposition party politics led by Morgan Tsvangirai caused
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a political clash in 2008 elections. Mugabe responded by deporting military forces
in all parts of the country in a bid to silence any form of opposition. This led
to countrywide political violence whereby many atrocities were committed. Op-
position politicians were arrested. Supporters, human rights activists, journalists
and university students were bitten and terrorised by the military forces (Dube,
2012). Political violence disrupted the way the economy functioned leading to
capital flight and loss of international support. It was after 2008 that the economy
started to show signs of recovery as shown by the trends in GDP. The country con-
tinues to experience economic and political hurdles which will make the journey
to full recovery long.
Figure 2.1: Annual growth in GDP
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To summarize the country’s economic performance from 1980 to the present, l
use trends in GDP. GDP is not a conclusive measure of a country’s economic
state given the difficulties encountered in measuring GDP, however it remains
an important variable in studying economic growth (Henderson and Storeygard,
2012).
2.1 Key economic sectors
In this section, I focus on the main economic sectors that drive the economy of
Zimbabwe. I highlight how the different sectors of the economy contribute to the
country’s GDP. Zimbabwe unlike resource abundant countries such as Botswana,
DRC and Zambia which heavily depend on minerals, successfully built a diversified
16
economy comprised of a strong manufacturing sector, vibrant commercial agricul-
tural sector, booming tourism industry and a thriving mining sector (Hawkins,
2009).
Figure 2.2: Agriculture as a percentage of GDP
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Since 1980 agriculture has been the backbone of the Zimbabwean economy earn-
ing its name as the breadbasket of Africa. Agriculture represents an average of
15 per cent of GDP. Agriculture is an important large source of foreign currency
contributing 40 per cent of total foreign exchange earnings with tobacco being the
main export product. Other important agricultural products that are produced
for export include sugar, tea, coffee, fruit and vegetables just to mention a few.
Zimbabwe has a dualistic agricultural sector with commercial farms producing ap-
proximately 70 per cent of output and the semi-subsistent farmers in the communal
lands producing the remaining output. Agriculture is key to the manufacturing
sector because it supplies 40 per cent of the inputs used in manufacturing (Doran,
2009). 70 per cent of the population directly depends on the land for survival. The
agricultural sector employs roughly 24 per cent of formal employment. (Weiner
et al. 1985; Thirtle et al.1993). As shown in the graph agriculture’s contribution
to GDP was affected by recurring years of drought and the land redistribution
programme in 2000. Share of agriculture in GDP has been falling since 2007 to
the present.
In addition, tourism plays a central role in the economy. Zimbabwe is well known
for its natural beauty hosting one of the Seven Wonders of the World, the superior
“Victoria Falls”, located in the northern part of the country. This puts the country
on the world map making it a perfect holiday destination. In addition, the country
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is adorned with a beautiful landscape filled with a wide range of wildlife. The
warm weather which runs throughout the year makes it possible to engage in a
wide range of outdoor adventures such as white-water rafting, hunting and botany
(Coomer and Gstraunthaler, 2011). From 1980 to 1999, the tourism industry
doubled its rate of growth from 20 percent to 40 percent recording the fastest
growing industry in the country. Tourism during the same years accounted for
8 percent of GDP open to improvement. However political instability coupled
with social and economic crisis in the year 2000 marked the decline of the tourism
sector. These events largely affected the flow of tourists into the country owing to
a huge drop in earnings from the industry. Contribution of tourism to GDP fell
from 8 percent to 3.3 percent by 2005 (Tourism in Zimbabwe, 2007).
Figure 2.3: Manufacturing as a percentage of GDP
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Equally important is the manufacturing sector. In 1980, manufacturing accounted
for the largest share of GDP and an important sector for employment. Easy ac-
cess to raw materials from the agricultural sector including the availability of a
well trained workforce and developed infrastructure contributed to a fast growing
manufacturing industry ranked second to South Africa in Sub-Sahara Africa. All
the shocks to the agricultural sector were equally absorbed by the manufacturing
sector given that the latter obtains 40 per cent of its inputs from the agricultural
sector (Doran, 2009). There has been a decline in the contribution of manufactur-
ing to economic growth since 1992 up until 2002 with slight improvement observed
after 2002 to the present.
Mining industry in Zimbabwe is now regarded as the anchor of economic growth
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Figure 2.4: Total natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP
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following the collapse of the commercial agricultural sector in early 2000 (Doran,
2009). Zimbabwe owns more than 40 different types of minerals with the most
valued minerals being gold, nickel, latterly platinum and ferrochrome. Figure 5
shows the importance of natural resources to the export economy contributing
an average of 40 per cent of total exports. Hawkins (2009) claims that natural
resources have the capacity to bring into the country total revenue of US2 billion
in export earnings per year with room to expand. As shown in figure 4, minerals
account for 5-6 per cent of GDP. This shows that minerals do not account for a
large share of GDP which renders their contribution to growth barely adequate,
however natural resources remain an important source of foreign currency earnings
and tax revenues ( Chachage et al 1993; Hawkins 2009).
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Figure 2.5: Share of mining in total exports (red) and total exports (blue)
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3 Background of Marange
Diamonds
Several scholars and researchers have written on the recently discovered diamonds
in Zimbabwe focusing on a range of issues. In June 2006, alluvial diamond deposits
were officially discovered in Marange district of Manicaland province in the eastern
part of Zimbabwe. The diamond fields are concentrated in Chiadzwa village of the
district, 100 kilometers southwest of the provincial capital city of Mutare. The
diamond fields are claimed to cover an area of 66 000 hectares of land (Katsaura,
2010 p.101). Chiadzwa village was inhabited by clusters of family rural subsistent
households of approximately 3000 who were relocated to a nearby farm called
Transau (Madebwe et al. 2005).
Masiya and Benkenstein (2012 p.2) and Cross (2012) claim that alluvial diamond
deposits were initially discovered in Marange in 2000 by a geologist working for a
South African company, De Beers Limited. The company held a legally binding
Exclusive Prospecting Order over the diamond fields in partnership with Zimbabwe
Ministry of Mines, which expired in June 2006. During the same year of 2006, a
London listed company African Consolidated Resources (ACR) secured claims over
a designated area of the diamonds fields. To start up their mining operations, ACR
put forward their plan to form a 50/50 joint venture with the state. The Ministry
of Mines dismissed the joint proposal leading to a loss of ACR’s claims on the
diamond fields to Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC). The fact
that no proper complete prospecting of diamonds was carried out in Marange,
official estimates of the amount of diamond deposits contained in Marange will
never be known but speculated.
In 2006, the Zimbabwean government proceeded to declare the diamond fields
open to anyone wishing to dig diamonds with the government as the main buyer
of the output through the state-owned company, Minerals Marketing Corporation
of Zimbabwe (MMCZ). This led to a diamond rush in September 2006. Informal
diamond mining activity grew so rapidly, such that in mid-December thousands
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of unregulated illegal artisanal miners were exploiting diamonds in Marange. The
emergence of a black market offering better prices for the informal miners’ diamond
output overthrew the government’s position as the sole buyer of the diamond
output. In late 2008, the government decided to restore state control over the
diamond fields by carrying out a military operation to evict informal miners out
of the diamond fields (Saunders 2009; Doran, 2009).
It is then that formal mining firms were granted rights to commence produc-
tion in partnership with Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC)
(Sachikonye, 2007). Different sources cite different number of diamond mining
companies operating in Marange. However, the widely cited companies include
Anjin, the largest Chinese mining company owned in a 50/50 joint venture with
the state. The second company is Mbada, formed by the government in partner-
ship with a South African firm called Grandwell Holdings. The last company is
Marange Resources wholly owned by the government (Cross, 2012).
3.1 Alluvial Diamond Industry
In this section, I describe the special characteristics of alluvial diamonds, the areas
where it is found and how it is mined. Alluvial diamonds are Africa’s major natural
resource, and they are mainly found in countries such as South Africa, Namibia,
Angola and Sierra Leone. Unlike gemstones which are valued for their clarity and
colour, industrial diamonds are valued for their hardness and heat conductivity.
Alluvial diamonds emerge from the primary source of diamonds known as the
kimberlite. Natural forces such as water and wind transport diamonds to other
places such as the base of a river or an ocean. These deposits are known as alluvial
diamond deposits. Alluvial diamonds are secondary diamonds that are near the
surface. Deposits of alluvial diamonds are not concentrated in a single specific
area but they stretch over large areas of land (Ross 2006, p.278; World Diamond
Council, 2012).
Primary diamonds from kimberlite are obtained from deep underground-shaft
mines that entail capital-intensive methods of mining, skilled labour and high
investment in technology rendering extensive involvement of the government in
partnership with huge corporations inevitable. This highly capital-intensive pro-
cess of extracting primary diamonds from the primary source kimberlite can also
be extended to alluvial diamond deposits. Alluvial diamond mining refers to the
way in which secondary diamonds are separated from deposits of clay, sand and
gravel. Industrial alluvial mining also entails formal procedures and involvement
of the state in partnership with mining corporations (Ross 2006, p.273, World
22
Diamond Council, 2012).
However, the fact that alluvial diamonds are scattered over large areas that cannot
be clearly distinguished means that they can only be mined by individuals in an
informal manner. This is termed small scale informal alluvial diamond mining
which involves digging and separating diamonds from the mud, sand and gravel
using simple tools such as shovels, sieves and pans. Informal mining is highly
intensive in unskilled labour. It is claimed that roughly 10 percent of the world
alluvial diamonds are extracted through formal ways, whereas 14 percent is mined
informally (World Diamond Council; Ross 2006 p.278; Auty, 2004 p.42).
Alluvial diamonds have a high value to weight ratio. They are of extremely low
weight and yet highly pricey which makes them a lootable resource. Diamonds
possess distinct features that set them apart from other voluminous commodities
such as copper, oil and sugar. Alluvial diamonds are highly attractive for their
low capital, production and operating costs. Their extremely high prices generate
quick cash flow even in an environment of rising production and transport costs.
Alluvial diamonds are important because they are easy to extract and transport
(Auty 2004 p.42).
3.2 Satellite Light Density Data
Lack of access to reliable, logical, consistent and complete data on the size of
diamond deposits and production output prompts the use of satellite light density
at night as a proxy to the level of economic activity in Marange diamond fields.
According to Chen and Nordhaus (2010) measures of night time lights are regarded
as a suitable substitute for measuring output levels. The lack of official data is
exacerbated by the fact that diamonds are easily lootable and thus extremely
difficult to calculate their accurate share in exports. I have chosen this method
because it conveys information about economic growth in situations where there
are no measures of income growth. First, this method sets in well with my study,
given that Marange is a remote marginalized area in a developing country which
lacks data on income growth. This makes night light data a critical tool for
someone not on the ground. Secondly, in events such as the discovery of minerals,
night light data enables the evaluation over a specific time period of regional or
local levels income growth (Henderson et al. 2012 ).
I start by defining night light data and how it is used as a proxy to measure
economic activity. Night light data is satellite images on lights taken at night.
Satellite data on lights at night can be used as a proxy for measuring GDP growth.
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The brightness and amount of light that is captured beyond the earth’s atmosphere
is used as a proxy for the level of economic activity on a particular spot. Brighter
and larger images of lights correspond to high levels of economic activity. Night
light data is accessed from the National Geophysical Data Center of the United
States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) website. Lack
of access to data on income growth in many developing countries has motivated
researchers to develop new methods of acquiring data. Recent papers that have
adopted the use of night light data as a measure of economic growth include Chen
and Nordhaus (2010), Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011) and Henderson et
al. (2011, 2012).
Figure 3.1: Changes in night light images from 2006-2007
Source: National Geophysical Data Center of the United States National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA)
I use changes in night lights as a measure of economic activity in Marange. This
raises the question of how exactly lights at night are related to economic activity?
The amount of human generated light observed from outer space shows the size of
human settlements and industrial activity. Light enables the consumption of a wide
range of goods in the evening and production activities that take place at night.
Light images captured at night show that people own the lights, it is accessible
and they have the income to purchase the electricity. Access to electricity enlarges
investment ventures that can take place during the evening. Availability of lights
shows that the government is able to supply public goods to the people given that
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electricity is a public good mainly supplied by the state. Brightness offered by
lights ensures security of property and wealth (Henderson et al. 2011).
Figure 3.2: Changes in night light images from 2008-2009
Source: National Geophysical Data Center of the United States National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA)
To explore the effects of the discovery of diamonds in the country, I use changes
in light intensity from the time of discovery in 2006 up to 2010 focusing on the
particular region where the diamonds were discovered, Marange and the nearby
provincial capital city, Mutare. The map in the figure shows Manicaland province
bordering with Mozambique from the eastern side. The big chunk of light rep-
resents Mutare. Marange diamond fields are located at the bottom south of the
province. This method allows me to clearly observe the gradual changes in income
growth from 2006 to 2010.
As seen from the images the provincial capital city of Mutare reflects more light
in 2006 than 2007. The decrease in light is attributed to the growing economic
hardships in 2007. Larger light images in Mutare in 2006 are partly explained by
the illegal diamond trading activities that began around 2006. Mutare the closest
city to the diamond fields emerged as the beehive of illegal trading activities in
diamonds. This suits in well with the line of events given that 2006 was marked
by huge numbers of informal diamond miners infesting the diamond fields. The
artisanal miners sold their merchandise to business elites and local people who were
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Figure 3.3: Changes in night light images in 2010
Source: National Geophysical Data Center of the United States National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA)
flocking into the city from all over the country including foreigners from different
parts of the world in search of the precious mineral. At one point Mutare became
one of the most expensive cities to live in Zimbabwe due to a lot of cash that was
floating around.
As we progress from 2007 into 2008 the amount of light continues to shrink. This
is evident of worsening economic hardships experienced across the country during
the same time which reduced the amount of economic activity on the ground as
shown by trends in GDP. During the same time the supply of electricity was erratic.
The whole country was undergoing chronic power cuts which sometimes left cities
in complete darkness. However to a lesser extent the banning of illegal diamond
mining could also have contributed to the drop in light as illegal trade in diamonds
was put to an end.
Throughout the years 2006-2009, Marange diamond fields were marked by com-
plete darkness but it does not necessarily mean that there was no activity taking
place at Marange. It shows that there was no development in terms of infrastruc-
ture such as roads, buildings and tower lights which was convenient for informal
miners who could only dig for diamonds during the night. Darkness was used as
a security measure by artisanal miners who wanted to keep their identities anony-
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Figure 3.4: Marange diamond fields: Changes in night light images from 2009-2010
Source: National Geophysical Data Center of the United States National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA)
mous and their output a secret from potential thieves and powerful agents who
were known for grabbing their diamonds.
By 2010, the first images of light were first captured in Marange which were also
coupled with an increase in light images in the city of Mutare. Growth in economic
activity is attributed to the commencement of industrial alluvial diamond mining
carried out by huge corporations in partnership with the government. The cor-
porations developed infrastructure in order to carry out mining operations. They
established roads, airstrips, buildings, flood lights and fencing to safeguard the
diamond fields from illegal miners and enable secure storage and transportation of
their output.
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4 Model
I consider the whole economy, in which identical entrepreneurs engage in either of
two activities. An entrepreneur can choose to be a producer in any of the sectors of
the economy producing output y for sale on the market. We assume an unforeseen
and sudden discovery of diamonds in the economy which creates excess rents that
are subject to rent seeking. Diamond rents denoted by D drive some entrepreneurs
into rent seeking. Grabbers can expropriate diamond rents D using all their ability
and rent seeking technology to seize as much rents as possible. Hence, the total
number of entrepreneurs in the economy is denoted by N = Np +Ng where Np are
producers and Ng are grabbers.
Diamond rents are greater than profits from production. Rent seeking draws pro-
ducers out of production in search of higher payoffs from grabbing. The degree
to which rent seeking activities flourish is dependent on the quality of institutions
that prevail in the country. We assume the quality of institutions is captured by
the parameter λ. λ captures the extent to which institutions tolerate rent seeking
activities over production. λ enables us to observe how much of the diamond rents
are captured by producers compared to grabbers.
The parameter λ runs from zero to one. A very low value of λ resembles extractive
institutions that allow rent seeking with a value of zero showing institutions that
are totally subdued to the interests of grabbers such that grabbers are able to seize
all profits from diamonds, each getting D
Ng
of the diamond rents. A higher value of
λ shows inclusive institutions that encourage investment and foster secure private
property rights. A value of λ as high as one completely erodes all profits from
pursuing rent seeking activities. Good institutions have the effect of equalizing
the gains from production and grabbing such that each entrepreneur gets D
N
.
1
λ
is a measure of the degree to which an entrepreneur gains if they decide to
pursue grabbing activities. A country with a lower value of λ poses greater gains
to grabbing which is met by a flow of producers from production into more gainful
rent seeking activities. In such a situation grabbing and production are rivalry
activities striving to outdo one another for profits. As the value of λ increases, gains
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from grabbing start to drop and there is no incentive for producers to shift from
productive activities into grabbing. This resembles a situation where production
and rent seeking mutually exist to complete each other.
The rent seeking factor S = S(α, λ), captures the interaction between quality of
institutions λ, fraction of producers α = Np
N
and grabbers 1− α.
S = S(α, λ) =
1
1− α + αλ
The factor S decreases in the quality of institutions λ and increases in the size of
producers α.
The payoff to each grabber is given by
pig = S
D
N
The grabbers’ payoff is higher the lower the quality of institutions. As the value
of λ increases from zero to one, profits for grabbers start to decline. Hence grab-
bers prefer weak institutions that are dismantled. The payoff for grabbers is also
increasing in the fraction of producers α. An increase in the number of producers
reduces competition for rents.
Each producer’s share of the resource rents is given by
pi = λS
D
N
The total payoff to each producer involved in production pip, is the sum of profits
from production pi and the share of the diamond rents λS D
N
, to give
pip = pi + λpig
Producers’ payoff is greater the better the quality of institutions. Good institutions
enable them to efficiently capture a larger share of the diamond rents.
4.1 Allocation of entrepreneurs
Following the discovery of diamonds, I look at internal and external factors that
determine the allocation of entrepreneurs between producers and grabbers. I treat
payoffs to each activity as an internal factor that is observed by every entrepreneur
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and is associated with the allocation of entrepreneurs. But the question still re-
mains that is it that simple that every entrepreneur can always flow to the most
profitable activity as they wish or with every profitable activity there always exist
some external forces aimed at keeping others out in order to maximize gains. Are
payoffs the only factor driving the allocation of entrepreneurs between grabbing
and production or there is more to it? We assume that there are external factors
beyond the control of some entrepreneurs that restrict them from simply switching
to the most profitable activity with higher returns. To capture this idea we impose
the assumption of restricted entry into grabbing. We look at how the assumption
of restricted entry into grabbing affects payoffs and the allocation of entrepreneurs
between production and rent seeking. To this, we begin by relaxing the assumption
of restricted entry and assume that there is free entry into and out of grabbing. We
also study the effects of free entry on payoffs and the allocation of entrepreneurs
between production and rent seeking. In all cases we assume all entrepreneurs are
profit maximizers always seeking to join the more profitable activity if possible to
do so.
4.2 Free entry
Building on Mehlum et al. (2003) model, we begin by looking at the long-run
equilibrium where we assume all entrepreneurs, producers and grabbers are free
to move from production into grabbing and vice versa. With free movement the
only factor that determines the allocation of entrepreneurs between grabbing and
production is the payoffs in the two activities. In this section we look at how payoffs
from production and rent seeking influence the decision of entrepreneurs either to
become a producer or grabber. Following the assumption that all entrepreneurs
maximize profits , they are bound to flow to the most productive activity:
pip > pig implies change in α is positive
pip < pig implies change in α is negative
In order to achieve a stable share of producers and grabbers over a period of time,
the profits must be equal in both activities
pip = pig
At the point of equilibrium b, the equalization of profits in both activities means
that there is no gain to any entrepreneur by switching activities.
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Figure 4.1: Rent seeking and free entry
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Let us now take into account the discovery of diamonds in the economy. How does
the assumption of free movement affect payoffs to production and grabbing and the
allocation of entrepreneurs between the two activities? The discovery of diamonds
presents a new source of income in the economy. The question of which profit
curve will be shifted upwards depends on the quality of institutions. Deterioration
in the quality of institutions captured by a low value of λ results in an upward
shift of the grabbers profit function which responds positively to a decrease in
λ. The dashed line in the diagram shows completely grabber friendly institutions
with λ = 0, causing an entire shift in the grabbers profit curve accompanied by no
change in the producers profit curve. Assuming free entry into grabbing, pig > pip
leads to a new equilibrium b′′. This is characterized by a flow of producers into
grabbing in search of higher profits. The overall effect of this movement is to drive
profits all the way down to equilibrium b′′. Equilibrium b′′ has lower profits, very
few producers and an increased number of grabbers.
4.3 Restricted entry
Let us assume an economy with purely extractive institutions captured by λ = 0,
that discovers diamonds. In this case diamonds provide a new source of income for
grabbers which is met by an upward shift in the grabbers’ profit curve while the
producers profit curve remains constant. Grabbing is regarded lucrative given that
the returns to grabbing greatly exceed the returns to production. With pig > pip , it
is the desire of every entrepreneur to specialize in rent seeking activities. However,
the discovery of a precious mineral such as diamonds which presents an extremely
large source of income always comes with restrictions on who can gain access into
the most profitable activity, in this case grabbing. With every profitable activity,
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not every entrepreneur is able to take part in it. This is exacerbated by the fact
that it is in the best interest of entrepreneurs that have secured their places as
grabbers to restrict entry of other players so as to maximize personal gains for an
extended period of time.
Situations of social crisis and limited resources evoke insider and outsider identities
for self categorisation. Insiders mostly have a superlative description of themselves
against the outsiders. Identities are used as a way of claiming access to particular
benefits at the same time restricting access of the others. We refer to entrepreneurs
who are already grabbers as insiders. Insiders are politicians who use their political
power to secure their places as grabbers. Outsiders are producers in different
sectors of the economy. Entrepreneurs in the economy are now denoted by N =
Ig + Op. Given that the free movement equilibrium b
′′ leaves both insiders and
outsiders worse off than they were prior discovery of diamonds, there is an incentive
for insiders to shut entry of new entrepreneurs into grabbing. Hence, insiders will
restrict entry of producers into grabbing. We assume that the size of insiders is
strictly less than the size of outsiders.
We now look at how the assumption of restricted entry into grabbing affects the
allocation of entrepreneurs and payoffs to grabbing and production. An upward
shift in the grabbers’ profit function following discovery of diamonds results in two
different equilibriums for grabbers and producers.
Figure 4.2: Rent seeking and restricted entry
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The profits for producers remain unchanged at equilibrium b following a shift in
the grabbers profit function. Profits for grabbers are pushed all the way up to
equilibrium b′. Despite the fact that grabbers get the whole share of the resource
income, equilibriums b and b′ resemble higher profits for producers and grabbers
respectively compared to equilibrium b′′.
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4.4 Free entry and restricted entry
In this section, I assume free entry of grabbers into production as returns to pro-
duction exceed returns to grabbing and restricted entry of producers into grabbing
as the returns to grabbing increase. An increase in the producers’ profits follows
an improvement in the parameter λ capturing better institutions. This leads to
an upward shift in the producers profit function coupled with no change in the
grabbers’ profit curve. A movement in the producers’ profit function results in two
different equilibriums depending on whether insiders decide to shift to productive
activities or not. If grabbers do not switch to production their profits remain at
equilibrium b whereas profits for producers rise to equilibrium b′. With pip > pig,
insiders as profit maximizers are bound to flow to the more profitable production
activities. Such a movement gives a new equilibrium b′′′. In the diagram this is
shown by the movement from the solid vertical line to the dashed vertical line.
Equilibrium b′′′ has higher profits for insiders and outsiders, very few grabbers and
vast number of producers. Equilibrium b′′′ is superior to all the above equilibriums
because all entrepreneurs reap the highest payoffs. Equilibrium b′′′ creates an in-
centive for producers not to restrict entry of grabbers as the profits to production
increase.
Figure 4.3: Diamonds and Producer-friendly Institutions
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5 Implications of the model
under different institutions
5.1 Free entry under Grabber-friendly Institutions
The model shows that the discovery of a new resource in countries with weak
institutions that allow free movement of entrepreneurs into rent seeking has un-
desirable consequences for all entrepreneurs and the entire economy. Availability
of higher natural resource rents in countries with a weak legal system has the
effect of increasing the gains to grabbing and eroding profits to production. As
all entrepreneurs are driven by the desire to make profit, it is natural for every
entrepreneur to shift from less profitable production activities into rent seeking
activities which offer higher returns. The effect is to pull entrepreneurs from pro-
ductive activities into rent seeking activities. This reduces the size of producers
in the economy. Producers are important in any economy because they invest
current wealth to generate more wealth. Producers create economic value by pro-
ducing goods and services. Hence the discovery of a mineral coupled with a shift
of producers into grabbing leads to a reduction in output in the economy. The
economy is not able to generate new profits and continues to spend current profits
circulating in the system.
Rent seeking activities involve spending existing income without generating extra
wealth. Movement of producers into grabbing creates an economy that is largely
dominated by rent seekers which creates new problems for the economy in addition
to those mentioned above. Rent seekers are known for wasting resources. This
means that they will squander the higher income owing to the discovery of the
natural resource. A wastage of the resource rents that is coupled with very few
entrepreneurs remaining in productive activities to generate new profits results in a
fall in total income. The few producers cannot replace income wasted by grabbers
at a faster and larger pace to keep profits in production and aggregate income from
falling. A larger proportion of entrepreneurs engaging in rent seeking activities
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causes greater competition for the small profits generated by few producers. The
overall effect stemming from reduced production and persistent grabbing is to
further push down the aggregate level of income in the economy such that the
drop in total income exceeds the increase in income generated by the natural
resource (Torvik, 2002). In terms of growth, the country converges to an income
level that is lower than the initial level before discovery of the mineral (Mehlum et
al. 2006). The model predicts that countries with poor institutions are better off
without natural resources when entrepreneurs have the freedom to switch to the
most profitable activity which has bad consequences for economic growth.
5.2 Restricted entry under Grabber-friendly Institutions
The model shows that the discovery of a mineral in countries with bad insti-
tutions has desirable effects when producers are restricted entry into grabbing.
The increase in income created by the natural resource has no effect of pulling en-
trepreneurs from running productive firms into rent seeking activities. The restric-
tion of producers into rent seeking implies that there is no decrease in production
profits and output levels in the economy. In this case, grabbers seize the entire
resource income owing to the discovery of minerals. This explains why grabbers
would like to remain few by restricting entry of outsiders. It avoids competition
among grabbers and they are also able to secure large shares of the fixed pie.
The discovery of a mineral in this case only benefits the economy in terms of main-
taining the levels of production by not pulling producers into grabbing activities
hence keeping the total income constant. Producers continue to produce steel,
clothing and footwear, food commodities and chemicals. However the higher nat-
ural resource rents wholly accrue to insiders. Although it is in the interest of the
economy that grabbers restrict entry of producers into grabbing it has the effect
of creating huge inequalities in the society. Ray (1998) claims that inequalities in
society are not entirely bad for economic growth. Inequalities in society are neces-
sary for growth in the initial stages of development. The rich people in society have
a higher marginal propensity to save. This means that as their incomes increase so
do their savings rate. For each extra dollar of income that accrues to the rich they
tend to save even more. In this case, it is in the best interest of the economy to
channel more resources towards the rich than the poor. High rates of savings foster
investment, which is needed for growth. However, inequality among individuals
seeds grievances and resentment among the disadvantaged people which ends up
in undesirable political outcomes (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012 pp.40-41).
The discovery of a resource in states with bad institutions that restrict entry of
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producers into rent seeking activities does not distort the existing state of affairs in
the economy. The economy continues to run as if nothing occurred. The net result
is that there is no change in total income following the discovery of the natural
resource. In terms of growth, the country converges to the same income level as it
had prior the discovery of the resource. The model predicts that the discovery of
minerals has no negative effect on the economy of countries with poor institutions
as long as producers do not abandon running productive firms in favour of rent
seeking activities.
5.3 Free entry under Producer-friendly Institutions
Countries with inclusive economic and political institutions reap the highest possi-
ble benefits from the discovery of a resource when there is free movement of insiders
into production and restricted entry of outsiders into grabbing. The higher returns
to production following the discovery of a mineral in producer-friendly institutions
lures or pulls grabbers from rent seeking activities into production. In this case
there is an incentive for producers to allow entry of insiders into the more prof-
itable activity of running productive firms. Producers will not restrict the entry
of grabbers into production due to a number of reasons. A shift of entrepreneurs
from grabbing increases the total number of entrepreneurs engaged in productive
activities. An economy that is dominated by producers has the effect of increas-
ing output levels in the economy, which raises profits to production. With few
grabbers remaining in the economy it reduces the chances of extortion among
producers. The higher income from the discovery of the resource is not wasted.
The net effect is to further push up the aggregate level of income in the economy
such that the increase in total income exceeds the increase in income created by
the natural resource (Torvik, 2002). A country with good institutions converges
to a higher income level achieving substantial growth (Mehlum et al. 2006). The
model predicts that discovery of minerals has the most desirable effects in countries
with a strong legal framework that attracts entrepreneurs into running productive
firms.
5.4 Relevance of the model to economic events in Zimbabwe
In this section, I use the model as a lens through which to identify key factors
and particular causes owing to the observed substandard levels of economic and
political development in Zimbabwe. I start by referring to the country’s economic
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events from 1980 to the present day and then proceed to use Marange experience
as a confirmation of the general pattern of political decisions in Zimbabwe.
As shown by the country’s economic performance from 1980, the corporatist and
liberal policies adopted by the state had their own successes and failures. Many
scholars agree that poor economic performance experienced under the adopted
policies was due to a stream of factors. Some factors such as economic challenges
posed by the policies, sudden withdrawal of development funds by the international
economic aid and occurrences of droughts were to a larger extent beyond the
control of the government. However other factors are crucial to attaining successful
economic policies. The effectiveness of policies not only requires great flexibility
and skill but it also depends to a larger extent on the nature of political institutions,
state relationship with civil society, and the ability of the state to establish order
and security, pass laws and enforce them. A strong complementary relationship
between economic and political institutions is vital to the success of any program.
Hence it is not purely a matter of the government having adopted wrong policies
that were doomed to fail (Brett 2005).
This therefore brings me to the central theme of my paper, which focuses on the
political factors as an important factor explaining the country’s poor economic
performance for the past two decades. The failure of political institutions to gen-
erate long-term stability and sustainable growth because of abandoning their duty
to ensure consistency, reliability, and dependability of economic institutions crip-
pled the economy. Political institutions favour economic policies that protect their
political interests and enable them to meet their political budgets. The corpo-
ratist ideology adopted in 1980 meant that the government could use state funds
to allocate jobs, contracts, and rents to its supporters. This type of economy did
not threaten the survival of the regime. It was until late 1980s that the economic
problems posed by corporatist policies started outweighing the benefits, leading
to the adoption of a market economy in 1990. The adoption of a market econ-
omy in 1990 generated economic institutions that threatened the survival of the
current political regime by diverting resources away from the government to the
rich capitalists. The market economy in sharp contrast with corporatist ideology
drastically reduced the amount of resources needed to finance the state at the same
time putting an end to the practices of patronage (Brett 2005).
The country’s macro-economic crisis began late 1997 and comprised of persistent
rising budget deficits, external debts and loss of support from the international
community. All these problems put a strain on the ability of the political in-
stitutions to pay their political debts. This forced the political elites to adopt
counterproductive policies that were insensitive to the current needs of the econ-
omy. The country’s economic events show evidence of political elites’ misuse of
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public funds. Such events include printing of money to pay out war veterans,
chaotic and miscalculated seizure of land from white farmers, costly involvement
of the government in the DRC war and funding of political violence in 2008. The
government used public funds for political endeavours which did not benefit the
society. The success of consistent economic policies aimed at ensuring growth de-
pends on the existence of strong and good political institutions able to enforce
secure private property rights, mobilize funds and ensure consistency of economic
institutions (Brett 2005).
The economic meltdown after 1997 following the political counterproductive de-
cisions taken by the state cannot be blamed on economic institutions failing to
adopt and maintain good economic policies aimed at fostering economic growth.
According to the annual trends in GDP there is evidence that the economy was per-
forming much better before 1997 which means that ESAP generated some positive
economic outcomes. The sudden drop in GDP after 1997 cannot be attributed to a
pure failure in economic policies but to the conscious decisions taken by the govern-
ment to engage in unproductive ventures. This shows an antagonistic relationship
between the country’s economic and political institutions (Brett 2005).
The discovery of diamonds in Marange is an example of the general pattern of
the extractive nature of existing political institutions. The chaotic and haphazard
government intervention in Marange diamonds shows how economic and political
elites abandon their duty to serve people in order to enrich themselves. This sup-
ports the idea by Chabal and Daloz (1999) who argue that African politics thrives
on confusion, uncertainty and chaos. This sets in well with Marange experience
which shows extreme measures taken by the government just to protect their polit-
ical interests. The inconsistent and unsound decisions taken by the government in
the extraction of diamonds and the use of state violence to evict civilians is char-
acteristic of a government that benefits from a political economy of disorder.
However, although political institutions in Zimbabwe are far from good they are
not completely dysfunctional. The night light images in Marange show significant
signs of economic growth. This shows evidence of institutions that are still func-
tioning in that they are able to organize and contract international corporations
to start formal diamond production for the good of the economy. Commencement
of industrial alluvial diamond mining in Marange entails extensive government in-
tervention and investment, a characteristic of good institutions. The government
was successful in putting an end to unproductive illegal mining in the diamond
fields and restoring order. This supports the idea that the state is able to establish
order and security in times of social unrest. Hence the institutional parameter λ
in the model is not entirely zero.
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The economic benefits of the discovery of diamonds on the local and national
economy are very difficult to assess given the lack of reliable data on revenues and
lack information on the distribution of diamond proceeds. The night light images
support development of infrastructure in the local village and the prospects of
employment to the local people. Opportunities to engage in unregulated mining
supported by foreign black market buyers in 2006 increased the liquidity of many
local villagers who could comfortably feed their families (Saunders, 2009). On a
national level diamonds have contributed to the national fiscus.
Overall, lack of strong and accountable political institutions in Zimbabwe has
greatly reduced the benefits that come along with precious minerals such as dia-
monds. The government should adopt transparent policies regarding mining opera-
tions and distribution of diamond rents. Political institutions should work together
with economic institutions to set up economically sound policies on how to spend
mineral wealth. This means that political elites should desist from misusing public
funds and work to improve the economy.
5.5 Conclusion
My contribution in this paper is to show the positive contribution of good polit-
ical institutions in countries endowed with natural resources so as to fully reap
the advantages that come with natural resources. A strong relationship between
economic and political institutions is necessary for resource endowed countries to
channel wealth from natural resources towards economic development for the good
of all sectors of the population. Abundant resources without the existence of inclu-
sive institutions able to faithfully manage the few resources at its disposal will not
foster growth. This seals the importance of establishing good political institutions
that work in harmony with economic institutions to ensure the use of resources
that benefits society.
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